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PRINCIPLES OF WAR AND THEIR APPLICATION 
TO STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
A lecture delivered by 
Captain G. K. Carmichael, USN 
at the Naval War College. 
August 17, 1950 
The task of the Naval War College mission is to further an 
understanding of the fundamentals of warfare, with. emphasis on 
their application to future naval warfare. Accordingly, it is 
my purpose this morning to examine some of the fundamental truths 
of war and to indicate how these so-called principles of war are ap­
plicable to strategy and tactics. 
Although exact definitions of the fields of war-strategy, tac­
tics, and logistics-are difficult to arrive at, and may create futile 
discussion as to semantic distinctions, some definitions are desirable 
as a basis for study and discussion. 
The dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for joint usage, issued· 
by the .Joint Chiefs of Staff, defines strategy and tactics as follows: 
Strategy is defined as : "The art and science of developing and 
using the political, economic, psychological, and armed forces of a 
nation, during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support 
to national policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favor� 
able consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat." 
It may be noted that this definition of strategy is broad in 
scope. It includes not only the military aspects, but also the politi­
cal, economic, and psychological aspects of a nation's conduct, during 
Captain Carmichael is a member of the staff of the Naval War College. 
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both peace and war. It has as its. purpose not only the winning· of 
war, but also of winning the peace by increasing the favorable con­
sequences of victory. In this sense the term is often referred to as 
"national strategy", or "grand strategy". Whfn the term strategy 
is restricted to the employment of armed forces it is someti:rµes 
spoken of as "military strategy", and it is in this sense that I shall 
use the term strategy in this discussion. 
Tactics is defined as: One, "The employment of units in com­
bat", and two, "The ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in 
relation to each other and/or to the enemy." 
Recent developments in the scientific field, such as radar, long 
range rockets, and guided missiles make it difficult to determine 
just when forces may be said to be in contact with the enemy; or 
even in combat, and, it becomes diffi�ult to differentiate be­
tween strategy and tactics, And, although it may be impossible to 
say at just what point the field of strategy, of tactics, or of logis­
tics leaves off and another of these fields begins, there are certain 
fundamental principles which govern in all three of these fields of 
warfare. These are the principles of war-principles which may be 
applied to arrive at strategic, tactical or logistical concepts of war. 
It has been said that the only thing constant in war is change 
itself. Throughout history, new inventions have dictated changes in 
strategy, tactics, and logistics. As for naval tactics, we can observe, 
for example, how the cannon changed the tactics of ramming and 
boarding to one of maneuver.and fire concentration out to the maxi­
mum gun range, or how Naval Air has changed the Battle Line con­
cept of capping the "T" of the enemy line to the Carrier Task Force 
concept of striking a crippling blow against the enemy fleet at the 
extreme range of the attack plane. 
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Let us consider for a moment the ten chief t�ctical principles 
formulated by Lord Nelson ,and employed by him with such suc­
cess. They are: 
1. The principle objective is the complete annihilation of the
enemy's fleet: partial victory is not enough.
2. Concentration of own masses against enemy fractions.
3. A close and decisive action is necessary.
4. Units must support each other and keep close to the enemy.
5. It is necessary for subordinates to know the plans of the com­
mander-in-chief, whose principal business is to bring the en­
emy to action on the most, advantageous terms.
6. The division of large fleets into squadrons whose commanders , ·· 
have full discretion.
7. Consideration of the moral qualities of an adversary is an
essential factor.
8. The order of sailing is the order of battle, and the less man­
euvering the better.
9. "Time is everything", and simplicity of method is desirable.
10. Victory must be followed up.
The basis of these tactical doctrines is the principles of war
-the principle of the objective, of mass, of the offensive, of man-
·. euver, of simplicity. However new weapons have dictated changes
in these tactical concepts. No longer is close action necessary to
destroy the enemy, and no longer is the "order of sailing the order 
of battle". Thus, it may be seen that, while tactics are fluid and 
ever changing, certain fundamental truths or principles .of war are 
constant. It is the application of these principles which is.variable, 
and not the principles themselves. 
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Often strategic and tactical changes have been slow in fol­
lowing the development of new weapons. To those nations who have 
first shown an appreciation of the strategic and tactical signifi�ance 
of. new weapons, there has accrued a distinct, and sometimes, a de­
eisive, advantage. For example, it was many years before the 
armies of the world appreciated the tactical significance of the 
maneuverability of fire power in the tank, motorized artillery and 
infantry, as embodied in the German Panzer Division. Yet, the de-
. cisive role that th� Panzer Division played against the static de­
fenses of the Maginot ljne is without question. 
Today, :with unparalleled advances in new weapons, it is 
essential that we develop new strategic and tactical concepts in or­
der to realize the. maximum effectiveness .from the tools available. 
Similarly, intelligence as to the developments and techniques of our 
possible enemies takes on an added significance. 
We must answer such questions as these. How, and under 
what circumstances, should we employ the atom bomb? Is it to be 
used primarily in a strategic or a tactical sense ? How may the 
enemy use the bomb? What active and what passive defense 
measures should we employ against the A bomb threat? From a 
Naval tactical viewpoint, what changes must we make in our dis­
positions for cruising, for battle, for amphibious assault? And the 
same type of study must be given to the implications of the many 
. other new developments-the jet plane, the rocket, the guided 
missile, and the true submersible. 
In early 1939 the old battleships New York and Texas were 
given what is now called radar equipment for full sca1e test afloat. 




implications of this new weapon were enormous. It was re-
ported on along these lines: It is the greatest invention since the 
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advent of radio; it wilf revolutionize naval gunnery and tactics. It 
was recommended that an immediate procurement program should 
be initiated to equip at the earliest possible time all battleships, 
carriers, and cruisers. As we review that report today, it was 
prophetic. And, yet, someone a1ong the line was slow in appreciating 
the urgency and soundness of those recommendations and decided 
to contract for only_ six (6) equipments to be installed in cruisers 
for further test and evaluation. Thus, a year or so, was largely 
lost, iilf period of an impending crisis, during which we could have 
equipped a major portion of our fleet with radar, developed our 
technique, and trained our personnel in its employment and main­
tenance. I cite thi.s example for two reasons; first to emphasize the 
enormous importance of adjusting quickly our tactical concepts to· 
new weapons; and secondly, to indicate that there are times when a 
new weapon should be expoited when it is a serviceable one-with" 
out waiting for the technical people and the scientists to produce 
what they consider to be a perfect, or near perfect, instrument. There 
are other times, however, when new weapons should not be employed 
until they are available in quantity. This will be indicated in later 
discussion. 
It is possible to find many instances of the technical bureaus' · 
keeping a weapon in the test stages long after it was serviceable, 
searching for this or that answer-which might well have come 
sooner if it had been put into service and given operational field 
tests. We might now do more toward getting the bugs out of some 
of our guided missiles, for example, and, certainly we could do more 
toward developing strategic and tactical concepts as how best to 
employ them if they were put into production now and gotten out to 
the operating forces. Time may be running out. And it takes time 
to develop techniques and train in the employment, servicing, and 
maintenance of new weapons. 
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Korea should prove an excellent testing ground for new 
weapons and new strategic and tactical concepts based on such 
weapons. To so make it, a deliberate and studied program should 
be initiated. The opportunity we have there is analogous to that 
which Germany utilized so effectively in Spain prior to World 
War II. 
Our tactical concepts today are largely those of World War 
II and need close examination and study to adapt them to the ne"". 
weapons being developed. It is a real challenge to condition our 
minds, not to World War II but to World War III concepts. It is not 
enough in solving military problems to dive into USF2 or USF4 or 
FMlOl-10 and come up with an answer. Use them, yes; but, by all 
means, try to devise something better than cruising disposition 4C 
or battle disposition 4M-something which considers the new 
weapons we have, and those which the enemy is likely to have. 
Now what to use as a basis for these new concepts? The 
Principles of War. They are based on all of military history and 
have stood the test of some revolutonary weapon developments 
and radical concepts of how to employ weapons. 
Before presenting them, a few words of .caution concerning 
their application are in order. They should not be considered as if 
they were religious tenets, but rather as guides in planning and ex­
ecuting military operations. The correct application of any one, or 
several of them, will not assure success, particularly when, at the 
same time, another of the principles is violated. In fact, the correct 
application of all of the principles may not assure success providing 
the morale forces are lacking. The human elements-morale, dis­
cipline, leadership-are so vital to success that they deserve our 
first and uninterrupted attention. You will recall that according to 
Napoleon "Moral force is to the physical as three to one." There 
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is always present the danger of becoming so engros&ed in the theory, 
art, or science of war (whatever you choose to call it) that the 
human factors are lost sight of, the initiative restricted, or the 
imagination dam�ened. There is also the danger of making the as­
sumption that these principles are all inclusive and offer a magic 
formula to resolve any military problem. A military commander 
must resolve for himself what the principles of war imply, and how 
they should be applied. 
']Clausewitz, a century ago, included the "gaining of public 
opinion", as one of the three fundamental objectives in war. It is 
probably just as important today-if not more so-than it was 100 
years ago, but to my knowledge it is not included in any present 
day listings of the principles of war. Nevertheless, one should exer­
cise in the application of the fundamentals of war in studying mili­
tary history and in the solution of military problems, until their 
use becomes second nature. In the heat of battle, application of 
these principles should be subsconscfous, not self-conscious. 
Currently the Army Command and Staff School lists nine 







7. Economy of Forces;
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Although you will not find the principles of war listed in 
any of the USF publications, as such, you will find the funda­
mental truths embodied in these principles in the doctrine and 
instructions contained in the Fleet Publications. 
The War Manual of the Royal Navy lists a total of ten prin­
ciples of war, which are, for the most part; identical to those taught 
in the U. S. Army. They do not, however, include Simplicity; 
instead they list Maintenance of Morale and Administration. 
Using the Command and Staff School list I shall make a few 
comments on each of the principles, with particular emphasis on 
their application to naval strategy and tactics. 
OBJECTIVE 
If any of the principles may be said to be more important 
than the others, that one is the principle of the objective. It is 
certainly fundamental, for it defines . the. mission or the aim. 
From the national strategic level it defines our national ob­
jective or aim. In war it implies the imposition of our nation's 
will upon that of the enemy. From the level of high military 
strategy it implies the imposition of our will by destruction of his 
will to resist, and normally, but not necessarily, entails the des­
truction of a large portion of his armed forces. 
At every level of command the proper selection of the ob­
jective is of the greatest importance. Properly, it should be one 
which supports the objective or mission of the next higher level. 
An excellent example of maintenance of the objective, (and 
I might say here that the British call this principle "Selection and 
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Maintenance of the Aim" rather than simply the Objective) is 
Admiral Spruance's action in defending the landing operations in 
the Marianas against naval air and naval surface attack instead of 
rushing out to meet the oncoming Japanese Fleet. The primary 
mission was an offensive one-the seizure of the Marianas. That 
mission could be best accomplished by isolating the objective area 
and defending against any incursion by the enemy. Admir.al 
Spruance, keeping in mind the primary mission, took a course of 
actio1½ which. would most nearly assure that mission being ac­
complished. 
Generally, in a naval engagement the tactical objective may 
be con�idered to be that part of the enemy's sea-air forces which 
has been selected for destruction or neutralization. By. tactical 
maneuvers one's major forces should be brought to bear on that 
part of the enemy's which it is important to overwhelm, the Bat­
tle of Midway is a · splendid example of a proper selection of the 
physical objective. Although the Japanese troop ships were 
tempting targets, the carriers were the main threat and were 
therefore chosen as the primary objective. 
OFFENSIVE 
This principle stems from an aggressive state of mind or a 
will to destroy the enemy. It is characterized by a desire on the 
part of the Commander and his subordinates to get at the enemy 
and to destroy him. Nelson embodied that spirit in his tactics of 
closing the enemy and annihilating him. It entails an assumption 
of the initiative and of denying the initiative to the enemy. 
The principle of the offensive does not imply that the de­
fensive should be ignored. Clausewit� contends that the defense 
is · "the stronger form of warfare" and that therefore a weaker foe 
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has a fair chance of assisting a more powerful one. Passive de­
fense measures, such as assuming tactical dispositions best suited 
to defend against threatening att�ck, are essential to avoid des­
truction. But the defensive measures should be employed so as to 
permit the seizing of any opportunity to take the initiative and 
to counter-attack with all the violence at one's command. The de­
fensive must always be assumed in the spirit of the offensive. It 
inay, for example, be assumed merely as a time device to gain time 
to mass the necessary forces at the proper place and at the prop­
er moment to commence the attack. 
The offensive does not imply headlong attack. It seeks to 
bring a vigorous and timely concentration of forces against a weak­
er concentration. A splendid example of the application of the 
principle of the offensive was had in the action of the Allies in 
landing in North Africa in 1942, on which occasion the initiative 
passed to us and our allies and remained with us for the remainder 
of the war. 
If the assumption of the offensive is going to comprise the 
chances of carrying out a mission, it may be necessary to assume 
the tactical defensive. For example,. the mission of an Escort Com­
mander of getting a convoy through might well require him to 
maintain a strong defensive formation and position and thus 
restrict his initiative in closing and attacking a threatening :force. 
Care must be exercised in assuming the offensive that one's 
own force is not over-extended or dissipated to the point that an 
enemy counter-attack will be successful. The principle of the of­
fensive implies a well-timed, well-coordinated attack at a decisive 
point. But it implies more than that. It implies an attack within 
the capabilities of the forces making the attack, in order that 
it may be sustained and followed up. Sustaining the offensive 
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is of such importance that some military students include in the 
principles of war the principle of pursuit. The success with which 
the German air force pursued the break-through in the low 
countries and in France in the last war and with which Montgom­
ery's "Desert Rats" pursued Rommel· certainly indicate that pur­
suit is a vitally important aspect of the Offensive if not deserving 
of a classification as a separate Principle of War. 
MASS 
This principle goes by many names-superiority, concen­
tration, force, and power. It does not necessarily imply an over-all 
superiority in numbers. It does imply a superiority of fighting 
power at a decisive point. 
To enumerate all the factors of fighting power would be an 
insurmountable task, but some of the main factors, as far as naval 
power is concerned, are fire power and fire concentration includ­
ing air power, ability to withstand punishment, maneuverability, 
and, of course, the human factors, such as morale and leadership. 
And, although a superiority may be enjoyed in several of the fac­
tors, it may not be enough if one or more of the others is lacking. 
For example, in spite of the enormous material superiority which 
the Japanese enjoyed at the Battle off Samar, the poor leadership 
of the Japanese Forces deprived them of an impressive tactical vic-: 
tory, if not a strategic one. 
MANEUVER 
Movement is the means by which plans are placed into effect. 
Maneuver, then, may be said to be the catalytic agent which fuses 
together the other principles. By mobility, forces may accomplish 
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mass or surprise. It gives to the Commander flexibility and free­
dom of action which he might not otherwise enjoy. 
Movement does not necessarily imply rapidity, although 
speed is frequently a vital factor in war. Movement is a relative 
matter, particularly in a tactical sense .. Certainly, the imp<>rtance 
of thinking of movement in terms of relative movement or relative 
motion need not be emphasized to officers of your experience. And, 
the importance of rapid, secure, and reliable communications in 
taking full advantage of the principle of movement is obvious. 
Three of Jomini's four fundamental principles of strategy 
are just as fundamental to naval tactics, and emphasize the enor­
mous part that movement plays in the art of war: 
"1. Maneuvering in such a manner as to engage one's major 
forces against parts only of those of the enemy. 
"2. In battle, by tactical maneuvers, bringing one's major 
forces to bear on the decisive area of the battlefield or on 
that part of the enemy's lines which it is important to 
overwhelm. 
"3. Arranging matters in such fashion that these masses of 
men be not only brought to bear at the decisive place but 
that they be put into action speedily and together, so that· 
they may make a simultaneous effort." 
In each of . these principles, maneuver and mobility is · the 
key to their successful application. 
And it is this principle of movement or mobility which gives 
such strength to carrier air power, The ability to move carriers 
quickly from the South Pacific to meet the Japanese threat at Mid­
way permitted our,Navyto strike a blow at the Japanese Forces of 
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such consequences as to change the balance of nav1;1.l power in the 
Pacific and to change the complexion of the war from the strategic. 
defensive to the strategic offensive. And while air power is in a 
tactical sense highly mobile, it is not so in ·a strategic sense, unless ·· 
the enormous air base installations and logistic requirements are 
available where required, or unless it is carrier borne. It is then, 
from this principle of movement or mobility that naval air power 
draws its great strength. 
SURPRISE 
Surprise may be · said to be a two-bladed weapon. On the 
one edge it is capable of inflicting great initial damage on the enetny; 
on the other of affecting adversely enemy morale, sometimes to the 
point of throwing· him .into complete confusion and thus making 
possible his destruction before he is able to regain his balance. 
Many_ things are conducive to effecting surprise--secrecy, 
deception, careful planning, faultless and rapid execution. Most 
important and often the most difficult to attain is secrecy, particu­
larly today with the great emphasis which is being placed on In­
telligence and with the many means available to collect in­
telligence. And yet, it appears that it is still possible to effect 
surprise---at least initially on a grand scale, for there is little evi­
dence available to refute that the invasion of south Korea came as a 
complete tactical surprise, if not as a strategic one. 
This principle ma,y be applied in the nature of surprise as to
time, place, force, technique, direction, and weapons employed. 
An excellent example of naval tactical surprise as to time is 
in the Battle of Savo Island, where the Japanese cruiser force 
arrived on the scene much ahead of the time that it was expected 
they might, if indeed they were expected at all, with the result 
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that four Allied cruisers were destroyed in almost as many minutes, 
before any effective fire could be returned on the Japanese 
attack­ing force. 
There are many examples where new weapons have come 
as complete tactical surprise-tanks, gas, magnetic mines, 
influence fuses, atomic bombs. Seldom, if ever, have they been 
decisive in determining the outcome of the war, ev�m though it 
appears that the new weapons, in some instances, might have been 
capable of so doing had they been fully exploited by the power 
which first had those weapons. The difficulty arises from the 
failure to employ them in mass, and from the failure to withhold 
them until such time as they can be so employed on a continuing 
basis. If surprise is to be most effective, it must be employed in 
conjunction with the other principles of war, particularly mass. 
New weapons often present contradictions which affect materially 
how and when they should be employed. The longer they are 
withheld, the greater the chance that the enemy will learn of 
them, especially when they are placed in mass production and 
when large numbers of personnel are en­gaged in training in their 
employment. Furthermore, it is a gamble to divert a large portion 
of one's war potential to the production and to training in the 
employment of a new weapon not battle­tested. It would 
appear that in World War I, the British might have been able 
to change the whole course of the war had they withheld the 
tank until it was available to the Allies for use in large 
numbers; or, in World War II, that the Germans might have been 
able to bring England to terms had they not employed the 
magnetic mine until they were able to do so in such mass as to 
tie up all shipping seeking ingress or egress to the British Isles. 
Instead, both of these new and revolutionary developments in 
war­fare were employed initially on a small scale and Before they 
could be used in mass. Thus, the opponents succeeded in developing a
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countermeasure or a defense against them, as has always been true 
when a new weapon is employed. 
As for the atomic bomb or the H-bomb, weapons of mass 
destruction, they can hardly be classed now as weapons of strategic 
surprise by virtue of being new weapons. However, they may be 
used as weapons of tactical surprise, both by us and the enemy, as 
to time, place, and technique of their employment. It, therefore, 
behooves us to give serious study to the offensive and defensive 
tactical implications of this new weapon. Having lost its effect­
iveness as a new weapon of strategic surprise, might it not be em­
ployed to advantage tactically as well as strategically? 
Before leaving this principle, I should like to point out that 
one of the inherent strengths of sea-air power is its ability to 
achieve surprise, both strategically and tactically. Mobility and 
weather are two factors which greatly contribute to this ability. 
Some may contend that as a result of new developments 
such as long range all-weather search planes, equipped with 
A. E.W., it is no longer possible.for Carrier Task Forces to.achieve 
surprise. On that I should like to make these observations. The 
achieving of tactical surprises will be more difficult. However, if 
developments in carriers and ·carrier-based all-weather long range 
attack planes and A. E. W. planes are permitted to go ahead, the 
achieving of tactical surprise should stiU be possible. As for 
strategic surprise, the comparative strategic mobility of carrier­
based air forces, as opposed to that of great land-based air forces, 
will still make it possible for carrier air power to achieve strategic 
surprise. It is significant that Germany was not able to move any 
appreciable amount of air power to resist the movement of the 
Allies onto the beaches of Normandy. 
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SECURITY 
Security includes all measures to deny to the enemy the 
means of gaining intelligence or of inflicting damage on own forces. 
It also embraces means to obtain information about the enemy in 
order to institute better security measures, such as protecting own 
lines of communications. 
It implies a defensive attitude, but there are occasions when 
the offensive must be assumed to gain the necessary security for 
own forces. For example, the offensive was assumed in our land­
ings at Guadalcanal in order to obtain security for our lines of com­
munication to Australia while we were still on the strategic de­
fensive. 
Among the passive measures which may be essential to se­
curity from a naval viewpoint are: radio silence, combat air 
patrols, electronic countermeasures, air searches, ASW patrols, 
radar pickets, zigzags, radio and radar intercept watches. These 
and many others may be employed to avoid the enemy's taking one's 
forces by surprise and to better enable one's own forces to be pre­
pared to resist attack and to counterattack effectively. 
Before leaving. this principle of security, there is another 
aspect thereof which is today more significant than at any time in 
history since the Trojan horse; that is, security on the home front, 
security against the fifth column, and security against subversion 
and sabotage. These may be the most powerful weapons in the 
enemy's arsenal, unless we are forever on guard and take the of­
fensive against them whenever and wherever the occasion demands. 
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ECONOMY OF FORCE 
Economy of Force implies a proper proportionment of avail­
able forces both in regard to space and time. It aims at effecting 
mass at the decisive place at the proper time. To do so may 
necessitate a reduction of forces at other points to those required 
to maintain the bare minimum of security. It, thus, entails a com­
promise between concentration and dispersion. It should aim to ef­
fect the desired concentration of own forces while, at the same time, 
causing the enemy to disperse his forces. 
Although economy of force does not imply, in a tactical 
sense, cutting down all along the line to bare essentials, it does im­
ply that in the strategic sense. For, as the scope of wars seems ever 
to increase and the limit of the nation's natural resources to de­
crease, it becomes more and more urgent that we weigh contin­
ually· the gain against the cost and strive to proportion properly 
our sources of national strength, such as manpower, critical ma­
terials and industrial capacity. Both, strategically and tactically, 
the selection of proper weapons to be employed is of vital importance 
in application of the principle. 
Economy of force, like that of surprise, again brings out in­
herent strength in sea-air power. The strength is derived, in the ap­
plication of this principle, from the ability of sea-air forces to con­
centrate great striking power at any one of many points about an 
enemy's defensive perimeter, thus making him disperse to meet this 
ever present threat. During the past war in the Pacific, the Fast 
Carrier Task FoI'ces were employed on the strategic offensive (and it 
should be noted that Admiral Nimitz and the Joint Chiefs opposed 
any operations ':'7hich would; for an extended period, tie these forces 
down to a defensive role) fThus employed, they were able not only to 
inflict great material dama�e on the Japanese forces;, but, probably· 
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more important, they were able �o require a wide dispersion of 
enemy forces, especially air forces, and to make possible the isola­
tion of any objective. 
And, in spite of some contentions to the contrary that never 
again will major amphibious forces be employed, circumstances and 
economy of force may dictate that such a course of action is best. 
In the last war with Allied troops concentrated in the Brit­
ish Isles and the necessary air and naval forces available to project 
them against the continent of Europe, Germany was forced to 
disperse her defenses from Norway -to the southern coast of 
France. Thus, both sea-air and amphibious forces permit own forces 
to be concentrated, while, at the same time, requiring the en'emy 
to disperse his forces. 
UNITY OF COMMAND 
Unity of Command implies cooperation. In fact, until recent­
ly, the Army Command and Staff School called this principle the 
Principle of Cooperation. The British still do. 
With the · advent of the Western Union and the Atlantic 
Pact, this principle takes on a significance far greater than ever 
before, for it aims at unified action, not only among armed forces 
of our nation, but among all the nations with a common aim., It has, 
as its root, a spirit of unselfishness, a feeling of confidence in leader­
ship, and a desire to do, .within the limits of capabilities, what is 
necessary to accomplish the objecUve without seeking for one's self, 
one's ship, one's service, one's nation, any glory except that which 
may accrue, in the course of eve,nts, from doing that which needs 
to be done for a common cause. 
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It is a principle to which we must constantly direct our at­
tention. The cooperation which characterized the relations between 
the United States, Britain, and the British Commonwealth Nations 
during the past war was excellent. The problem of attaining a 
similar degree of cooperation and unity of command among the 
twelve (12) North Atlantic Pact Nations is one of the greatest 
magnitude. 
1-'here is an ever growing feeling among the Atlantic Pact 
Nations that Unity of Command must be effected if that Pact is 
going to succeed in accomplishing its objective. That feeling has 
been expressed in recent speeches of such leaders as Mr. Churchill 
and Mr. Spaak. 
Cooperation, fortunately, is something which can be learned 
and nurtured in our daily contacts. It is a spirit which must be de­
veloped before the heat of action. And it must be developed to 
such a degree among our Allies that Unity of Command will be at­
tained. 
SIMPLICITY 
Simplicity is a principle which may be applied to many factors 
in war-among others, organization, planning, order writing, man­
euver, weapon and equipment design. It makes for order and 
tends to eliminate the well known process of order-eounter­
order-disorder. 
Many of you will recall how our fleet maneuvers, during a 
period between the two world wars, became more and more com­
plicated, year by year, until we got to the point that the captain of 
a capital ship needed one of two signal officers, a tactical officer and 
a couple of plotters to assist and advise him in formation maneuvers, 
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. and how the three or. four signal halyards were �ept, almost_ con­
stantly chock-a-block with bunting. I recall how one of our Ad­
mirals used to deplore, with great rage, that tendency, and point 
out that, during his tour of duty as a destroyer skipper in the 
Irish Sea during World War I, the only special flags or pennants 
that he ever saw were Corpen, Turn and Speed. , He said that we 
must simplify our maneuvers if we ever got into action. Our Fleet 
did not appreciate that fact until we did get into a shooting war, 
when it became necessary that we revise our tactical concepts; or at 
least our techniques of maneuvering. However, in the field of 'am­
phibious warfare, there still remains much to be done to simplify 
those inherently complicated operations. 
Simplicity in order writing has many virtues. It reduces·. 
the verbiage, it reduces the load of communications, it adds to se­
curity, and probably most important of all, it may give the sub­
ordinate some freedom of action and permit him to use his in­
itiative. One of the keys to this is to tell WHAT is to be done and 
avoid telling the subordinate HOW it is to be done. 
In conclusion, strategy and tactics, like war itself, are ever 
changing and depend on weapons. As new weapons become avail­
able,. new strategic and tactical concepts for their emplQyment 
must be evolved, and evolved quickly. The best guides we have 
available in developing these new co)?.cepts, in the absence of a 
shooting war, during which they should and can be evolved and 
tested, are the Principles of War-objective, offensive, mass, man, 
euver, surprise, security, economy of force, unity of command, an_d 
simplicity. While it may seem at times that these principles are 
contradictory they are in fact complementary, the application of any 
one or several of them may not assure success. The necessary 
blending of them all is essential. But even more essential are the 
human factors of morale, discipline, and leadership. 
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